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Objective and Subjective Tests in the Law
R. GEORGE WRIGHT *
ABSTRACT
Across many subject areas, the law commonly attempts to distinguish
between objective and subjective tests, and to assess the merits of objective as
opposed to subjective legal tests. This Article argues that all such efforts are
fundamentally incoherent and ultimately futile in practice. As demonstrated
below, what the law takes to be objective in the relevant sense is essentially
constituted by what the law takes to be subjective, and vice versa. Judicial
preoccupation with objective and subjective tests thus does no more than
distract from more meaningful concerns. Judicial attention should be directed
away from this hopeless distinction, and instead focused on devising tests that
best reflect the substantive interests at stake in any given context.
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INTRODUCTION
The law takes largely for granted that there are meaningful and important
distinctions, in various contexts, between objective and subjective legal tests.
The law tends to focus instead on endless controversies over when to apply a
supposedly objective test, and when to apply a supposedly subjective test.
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Disputes over the merits of supposedly objective and subjective tests thus
pervade the law. Such disputes recur, for example, in various contractual,
commercial, and business law contexts; 1 in contexts of negligently, recklessly,
or intentionally committed torts; 2 in criminal law and sentencing contexts such
as those involving probable cause, search and seizure, property forfeitures,
entrapment, and death penalty eligibility; 3 in Title VII employment
discrimination cases; 4 in Section 1983 qualified immunity cases; 5 in numerous
First Amendment contexts; 6 and in cases involving a combination of allegedly
ineffective assistance of counsel and defendant deportability. 7
Distinctions between objectivity and subjectivity in one sense or another
are important in fields apart from the law, including, merely for example,
probability theory, 8 moral philosophy, 9 and philosophy more generally. 10
Legal theorists as well have addressed issues regarding the meaning and proper
scope of supposedly objective and subjective tests, 11 usually with reference to
what a presumed “reasonable person” or else some broad group, would or
might think in a given situation. 12
But as it turns out, the case law should inspire skepticism as to the value—
and indeed the sheer coherence—of distinctions between supposedly objective
1

See infra Section I.
See infra Section II.
3
See infra Section II.
4
See infra Section III.
5
See infra Section III.
6
See infra Section IV.
7
See infra Section V.
8
See, e.g., IAN HACKING, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY AND INDUCTIVE
LOGIC 131 (2000) (describing the ideas of objective and subjective probabilities as
“terrible terms, loaded with ideology”); John C. Harsanyi, Bayesian Decision Theory,
Subjective and Objective Probabilities, and Acceptance of Empirical Hypotheses, 57
SYNTHESE 341, 343–44 (1983) (describing subjective probabilities as referring to
persons’ actual betting choices and objective probabilities as the “statistical behavior
of a given physical system,” such as the frequencies of particular outcomes or
tendencies). See also Colin R. Blyth, Subjective vs. Objective Methods in Statistics,
26 AM. STATISTICIAN 20 (1972) (contrasting objective values with “insights,
intuitions, opinions, impressions, hunches, guesses, prejudices”). Lawyers can
attempt to utilize a similar distinction between objective and subjective probabilities
in legal contexts. See, e.g., Eric A. Johnson, Is the Idea of Objective Probability
Incoherent?, 29 L. & PHIL. 419, 425 (2010) (distinguishing an actor’s subjective
estimates of probabilities from probabilities drawn from “what the actor believed,
knew, or should have known about the underlying facts”).
9
See, e.g., STEPHEN DARWALL, PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS 19 (1998) (“[T]hat we
take ourselves to be fallible and never fully able to transcend our own subjective
standpoints is itself evidence of the objective purport of ethical opinions.”); HENRY
SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 207 (Hackett 1981) (1907) (“[N]o act can be
absolutely right . . . which is believed by the agent to be wrong. Such an act we may
2
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call ‘subjectively’ wrong, even though ‘objectively’ right.” (footnote omitted)); Dale
Dorsey, Objective Morality, Subjective Morality, and the Explanatory Question, 6 J.
ETHICS & SOC. PHIL. 1, 2 (2012) (explaining that subjective views assess “the moral
quality of actions in a way that is sensitive to agents’ epistemic circumstances,”
whereas objective views do not).
The approach to morality known as “ideal observer theory” ultimately involves
some combination of purportedly objective and subjective perspectives. See, e.g.,
Vernon J. Bourke, The Ethical Role of the Impartial Observer, 6 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS
279 (1978); Richard B. Brandt, The Definition of an ‘Ideal Observer’ Theory in Ethics,
15 PHIL. & PHENOM. RES. 407 (1955); Roderick Firth, Ethical Absolutism and the
Ideal Observer, 12 PHIL. & PHENOM. RES. 317 (1952). See also classically, ADAM
SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 16–30 (Economic Classics ed., 2013)
(1759) (discussing the role of the “impartial spectator”).
10
See, e.g., RICHARD RORTY, OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH 21 (1991)
(regarding “objectivity” as supposedly transcending real or even imaginary groups);
LORRAINE DASTON & PETER GALISON, OBJECTIVITY 379 (2010) (“All the multiple
senses of objectivity intersect in their opposition to subjectivity”); SANDRA HARDING,
OBJECTIVITY AND DIVERSITY: ANOTHER LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH x (2015)
(“[O]bjectivity ‘is not a single idea, but rather a sprawling collection of assumptions,
attitudes, aspirations, and antipathies,’” and is at best “an essentially contested
concept”).
For a more substantive discussion, see NICHOLAS RESCHER, OBJECTIVITY: THE
OBLIGATIONS OF IMPARTIAL REASON 7 (1997) (“An objective judgment . . . abstracts
from personal idiosyncrasies or group parochialisms. It is a judgment made without
the influence of individual or communal preferences and predilections.”); John
McDowell, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, 67 PHIL. & PHENOM. RES. 675, 676
(2003) (“This mutual intelligibility between ourselves and others requires us to
conceive objective reality as common ground between ourselves and our interlocutors,
potential and actual.”); V.J. McGill, Subjective and Objective Methods in Philosophy,
41 J. PHIL. 421, 421 n.1 (1944) (“Data are ‘objective’ if observable by more than one
person and ‘subjective’ when observable by only one.”).
11
See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF
CRIMINAL LAW 31 (2009) (“[P]roperly understood, recklessness is a subjective
concept that tracks the defendant’s assessment of the risk.”); KENT GREENAWALT,
LAW AND OBJECTIVITY 93 (1995) (distinguishing objectivity as external, or as linked
to reasonableness, from subjectivity as internal or personalized); MATTHEW KRAMER,
OBJECTIVITY AND THE RULE OF LAW 3 (“Every variety of objectivity is opposed to a
corresponding variety of subjectivity.”); id. at 94 (explaining one variety of objectivity
as involving properties “whose nature can be fully specified without reference to
certain actual or potential experiences in human beings”); Heidi Li Feldman,
Objectivity in Legal Judgment, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1187, 1187 (1994) (“[M]any are
ready to discontinue talk of objectivity altogether, on the grounds that it has been
nothing more than a mask for the oppressive practices of politically and economically
privileged groups, promising neutrality where in fact there are only power relations.”);
David M. Paciocco, Subjective and Objective Standards of Fault For Offenses and
Defenses, 59 SASK. L. REV. 271, 272 (1995) (“[T]he distinction [between objective
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and subjective legal tests. What is thought by the law to be subjective actually
pervades and informs, in multiple ways, what is thought to be objective, and
vice versa. The objective and the subjective, in effect, unavoidably help define
and comprise each other. The law’s attempts, in various contexts, to
differentiate or combine objective and subjective tests are thus inevitably
fruitless. 13
Ultimately, the law should seek to avoid relying on these incoherent
categories. Instead, the law should strive to devise tests that ask precisely what
to take into account, and precisely how to do so, in adopting rules and
adjudicating cases. The answers will vary according to context. Crucially,
though, all such answers must recognize any overriding constraints of fairness
applied to the relevant parties, and then seek to enhance some version of an
and subjective fault] is not just important—it lies at the very heart of the debate about
what we want criminal law to be.”).
12
Interestingly, courts sometimes distinguish reasonable beliefs from broad
community standards. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987) (assessing “value”
and the application of “community standards” in the obscenity context); see also R.M.
HARE, MORAL THINKING: ITS LEVELS, METHOD AND POINT 210–11 (1981) (in the
context of provocation, one sense of an objective test “asks whether a reasonable man
would have been provoked”); SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 65 (1989) (linking
what a presumably reasonable person would have believed to a subjective account of
rightness); Lisa J. Bernt, Finding the Right Jobs For the Reasonable Person in
Employment Law, 77 UMKC L. REV. 1, 1 (2008) (“Historically, courts have invoked
the reasonable person when looking to set some ‘objective’ or universal (as opposed
to ‘subjective’ or individualized) standard of conduct.”); Christopher Jackson,
Reasonable Persons, Reasonable Circumstances, 50 SAN. DIEGO L. REV. 651, 655
(2013) (in determining what counts as a legally relevant circumstance, “[t]he physical
features of the situation will likely be included, while the particular peccadillos of the
defendant probably will not”); Johnson, supra note 8, at 428 (“[T]he reasonableperson construct is ‘indeterminate through and through.’” (quoting Larry Alexander,
Inculpatory and Exculpatory Mistakes and the Fact/Law Distinction: An Essay in
Memory of Myke Bayles12 L. & Phil. 33, 51 (1993))); Neil McCormick,
Reasonableness and Objectivity, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1575, 1576 (1999) (linking
the behavior of the reasonable person with “the common standards of the
community”); Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 323 (2012); Peter Westen, Individualizing the Reasonable Person in Criminal
Law, 2 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 137, 138 (2008) (“Reasonableness in criminal law is an
objective standard; i.e., a standard that an actor’s conduct, mental states and/or
emotions may or may not succeed in satisfying.”).
13
The inescapable incoherence of any distinction between objective and
subjective legal tests goes beyond the mutual dependence of the concepts involved.
There is, for example, no full understanding of an even number without the idea of an
odd number. But that sort of mutual dependence is benign. The even number versus
odd number distinction is coherent in a way that the objective test versus subjective
legal test distinction is not.

2017

OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE TESTS IN THE LAW

125

overall well-being within those constraints. The focus of legal tests should
thus be on substance and procedure, as opposed to the hopelessly distracting
labels of subjectivity and objectivity.
In the end, one might try to replace futile quests for subjective or objective
tests by aiming specifically at the attractive goal of promoting equality.
Despite the constitutional and normative appeal of equality, however, taking
this path would ultimately be inadvisable. This is largely because even among
persons of the greatest insight and benevolence, the idea of equality quickly
fractures into a variety of more or less conflicting visions. If any single
underlying substantive aim can usefully, if imperfectly, inform legal decisionmaking in the place of futilely pursuing supposedly objective and subjective
tests, that aim may instead be the related idea of community. While the idea
of reasonably promoting community through law can take multiple forms, the
direct conflicts among visions of community may be less stark and
irreconcilable than those involving conflicting visions of equality.
We seek to validate each of these basic claims gradually, cumulatively,
and inductively, across various legal contexts, beginning immediately below.
I.

OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE TESTS IN CONTRACTUAL, COMMERCIAL,
AND RELATED CASES

The basic law of contract formation and interpretation introduces some
considerations that are crucial for our purposes. It is often suggested that
interpretation of contracts is somehow a matter of discerning and giving effect
to the mutual intent of the contracting parties.14 On a natural reading, this
might suggest that contract law seeks somehow to appreciate the subjective,
real, or genuine intent of the parties. But courts are often quick to draw back
from any such inquiry, focusing instead on what they apparently imagine to be
an independent, more public, more determinate, more reasonablenessoriented, and more standardized inquiry into supposedly objective
considerations. 15
14
See, e.g., Tribeca Companies, LLC v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 239 Cal. App.
4th 1088, 1111 (2015) (“A contract must be interpreted so as to give effect to the
mutual intent of the parties.” (quoting Winograd v. Am. Broad. Co., 68 Cal. App. 4th
624, 632 (1998))).
15
See id. (“The terms of a contract are determined by objective rather than
subjective criteria.” (quoting Winograd, 68 Cal. App. 4th at 632)); Grant Cty. Port
Dist. v. Wash. Tire Corp., 349 P.3d 889, 895 (Wash. 2015) (“Washington follows the
objective manifestation theory of contracts, looking for the parties’ intent by its
objective manifestations rather than by looking at the parties’ unexpressed subjective
intent.” (quoting Paradiso v. Drake, 135 Wash. App. 329, 336 (2d Div. 2006)));
Nicholas C. Dranias, Consideration as Contract: A Secular Natural Law of Contracts,
12 TEX. REV. L. & POL’Y 267, 294 (2008) (“Under the objective theory, courts focus
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Even if we take the “objective” approach at face value, cracks in the theory
quickly begin to emerge. An objective expression of intent is to be determined
by what one contracting party “would,” on the basis of the other contracting
party’s actions, tend to believe about that party’s intent. 16 However, what
somebody would believe is different than what somebody could, or even
might, reasonably believe. One can hardly claim that ordinary contractual
language typically bears only one reasonable interpretation, 17 such that a
reasonable person relying on the contractual terms would be bound to one
specific interpretation, rather than to a range of reasonable, but potentially
conflicting, interpretations.
Even more importantly, consider the subjectivities unavoidably involved
in selecting, or describing, the reasonable contracting party (or some other
reasonable interpreter of the contractual terms). We must choose to describe
that reasonable person’s circumstances, in one way or another. Are we to start
with the non-drafting party, impute reasonableness to that party in all relevant
respects, and then discount or ignore any supposedly unreasonable qualities,
biases, cognitive limits, values, priorities, quirks, or idiosyncrasies, whether
previously known to either party or not? Without attempting at this early point
to resolve the question, we pause merely to note that the idea of a reasonable
contracting party, no less than the idea of a reasonable 18 or impartial 19
spectator, is massively indeterminate and undertheorized. The idea of a
reasonable contracting party is, with rich irony, largely subjective in more than
one sense. Let us also momentarily set aside questions of which circumstances
involved in a case are relevant, weighty, controlling, or trivial.
Contract cases 20 and contract theorists 21 thus not surprisingly often try to
limit the dominance of any supposedly objective model of contract

on what a reasonable person in the position of the promisee would conclude another’s
behavior meant.”).
16
See Tribeca, 239 Cal. App. 4th at 111 (quoting Winograd v. American
Broadcasting Co., 68 Cal. App. 4th at 632)); Dranias, supra note 15, at 294; Wayne
Barnes, The Objective Theory of Contracts, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1119–20 (2008)
(focusing on “external acts and manifestations” as distinct from “subjective, internal
intention”).
17
For a classic discussion, see WILLIAM EMPSON, SEVEN TYPES OF AMBIGUITY
(1996 ed.) (1930).
18
For a brief introduction to the reasonable person standard, see supra note 12
and accompanying text.
19
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
20
See, e.g., N.A.P.P. Realty Tr. v. CC Enters., 784 A.2d 1166, 1169 (N.H. 2001);
Smith v. Boyd, 553 A.2d 131, 133 (R.I. 1989).
21
See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Contract as Agreement, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
353, 354 (2007); Recent Case, Contracts—Mutual Assent, 40 HARV. L. REV. 645, 645
(1927); see also Kabil Dev. Corp. v. Mignot, 566 P.2d 505, 508 (Or. 1977) (noting
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interpretation. One court, 22 for example, legitimizes both objective standards,
which supposedly apply “external criteria” 23 to the ascertaining of meaning,
and subjective standards, which supposedly refer to “the state of mind of one
or more parties to the agreement.” 24 Another court explained that “subjective
intent” is “indicative of objective intent,” and therefore “subjective intent may
be one of the factors which comprises objective intent.” 25 On such a view,
curiously, we are assumed to know a party’s subjective, internal intent, and
then use that knowledge to infer objective, external intent.
Courts often adopt a supposedly more subjective approach to contract
interpretation in so-called party-satisfaction cases, and even then with some
crucial complications. For example, a court may claim to apply a more
subjective test where the key issue of contractual performance seems to be one
of “fancy, taste, sensibility, and judgment,” 26 but not where the contractual
dispute focuses on “commercial value, operative or mechanical fitness, or
quality.” 27 Thus, apparently, matters of judgment are thought to be more
subjective, whereas matters of quality are thought to tend to be more objective.
This dichotomization raises obvious difficulties. One might wonder, for
example, whether a sports car’s performance is a matter of judgment or quality.
Does such a question have a subjective or an objective character? As this
simple example illustrates, determining when a subjective test or an objective
test is required is not as simple as these courts assume.
Adding a further complication, the courts in party-satisfaction cases
declare that reasonableness is irrelevant to subjective tests, but also that claims
of party dissatisfaction as to performance are “limited . . . by the duty of good
faith.” 28 The duty of good faith, however, necessarily involves an element of
reasonableness. 29 Thus, in these cases, the courts re-introduce elements of
purported objectivity into supposedly subjective tests.
The profound and inescapable murkiness of the distinction between
objective and subjective tests is further illustrated in typical commercial law

that the originally objectively-minded Professor Arthur Corbin eventually concluded
that an objective or subjective test, alone, cannot fully explain the law of contracts).
22
See N.A.P.P. Realty Tr., 784 A.2d at 1169.
23
Id. (quoting 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 31:1, at 256 (4th ed. 1999)).
24
Id.
25
Smith, 553 A.2d at 133.
26
Crum v. April Corp., 62 P.3d 1039, 1040–41 (Colo. App. 2002) (quoting Mike
Naughton Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 862 F. Supp. 264, 269 (D. Colo. 1994)).
27
Id. For a similar attempt at such a dichotomization, see AMFAC v. Waikiki
Beachcomber Inv. Co., 829 P.2d 10, 23 (Haw. 1992).
28
See Crum, 62 P.3d at 1041.
29
For discussion of either the purported objectivity or subjectivity of “good faith”
in various commercial contexts, despite the term’s apparent subjective focus, see infra
note 30.
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contexts. 30 Consider, merely for example, a dispute over whether a particular
defect in some good qualifies as a substantial defect, so as to justify a buyer’s
revocation of acceptance. 31 Many courts have concluded that such a legal
determination involves supposedly “subjective and objective aspects.” 32 One
such court explained that “the subjective component of the test takes into
consideration the particular buyer’s needs and expectations,” whereas, in

30

See, e.g., Choice Escrow & Land Title, LLC v. BancorpSouth Bank, 754 F.3d
611, 622 (8th Cir. 2014) (observing that “good faith” in the commercial context has a
[supposedly] subjective component of “honesty in fact” and a [supposedly] objective
component of observing “reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing,” but failing
to note that these labels could with some justification be reversed); State Bank of the
Lakes v. Kansas Bankers Surety Co., 328 F.3d 906, 909 (7th Cir. 2003) (Easterbrook,
J.) (positing that ‘“good faith’ usually establishes a subjective standard, while due care
is objective. Why write ‘in good faith’ if you mean ‘in the exercise of reasonable
care?’” and thus declining to recognize purportedly objective elements in the former,
or purportedly subjective elements in the latter); Kansas City Power & Light Co. v.
Ford Motor Credit Co., 995 F.2d 1422, 1430 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that good faith is
an “amorphous” concept); Schwegmann Bank & Trust Co. v. Simmons, 880 F.2d 838,
841–42 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting conflict over whether “good faith” of a holder in due
course focuses on “subjective or objective knowledge and conduct” and that “good
faith” does not involve a duty to investigate unless “the circumstances [objectively]
reveal a deliberate desire” to evade knowledge for [objectively] improper reasons);
Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 834 P.2d 1220, 1224 (Ala. 1992) (interpreting
UCC § 1-208 and reasoning, “[w]hile the debtor’s burden of proof may be difficult
because the debtor must delve into the creditor’s state of mind, the burden is not
impossible. That is, the debtor may . . . establish lack of good faith by proving that
the creditor did not have possession of the [relevant] information” and thus evidently
proving the apparently inaccessibly subjective by the apparently objective); Wohlrabe
v. Pownell, 307 N.W.2d 478, 483 (Minn. 1981) (“We have . . . discussed the good
faith requirement in Article 3 as a subjective standard rather than an objective
standard.”); Triffin v. Liccardi Ford, Inc., 10 A.3d 227, 229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2011) (“‘[A] holder in due course must satisfy both a subjective and objective test of
good faith.’” (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Triffin v. Pomerantz Staffing
Servs., 851 A.2d 100, 104 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004))); J.R. Hale Contracting
Co. v. United N.M. Bank, 799 P.2d 581, 591 (N.M. 1990) (noting “honesty in fact is
subjective and is concerned with the actual state of mind of the creditor,” but should
be determined “on the facts and circumstances”); Tolbert v. First Nat’l Bank, 823 P.2d
965, 970 (Or. 1991) (noting that the question of a bank’s good faith “should be decided
by the reasonable contractual expectations of the parties,” thereby further blurring any
possible objective test versus subjective test contrast in this context (emphasis in
original)); R.R. Comm’n v. Gulf Energy Expl. Corp., 482 S.W.2d 559, 568 (Tex.
2016) (referencing Black’s Law Dictionary as defining good faith as “a state of mind”
involving “reasonable commercial standards”.
31
See Kesner v. Lancaster, 378 S.E.2d 649, 654 (W. Va. 1989).
32
Id.
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supposed contrast, “[t]he objective element focuses on the actual defects,
which must not be trivial or insubstantial.” 33
Any such formulation may seem, on its face, sensible enough. But as an
attempt to coherently distinguish between a subjective and an objective
consideration, this formula is unsuccessful. Much of the point of referring to
something as a “need,” as above, in typical contexts, is to distinguish a genuine
need from a presumably more subjective “want” or “desire.” In the human
rights context, for example, the emphasis is often on objective, rather than
subjective, aspects of needs and corresponding basic interests.34 And we can
certainly imagine a judge interpreting the idea of needs in an apparently
objective light (any judicial test formulation to the contrary). 35
Correspondingly, it is far from obvious that debates over whether a defect
in a commercial good should be considered “trivial” 36 or “insubstantial” 37
should count as objective, 38 and not as subjective, in character. Suppose, for
example, the buyer of a used book reasonably anticipates no underlining or
marginal comments therein. It turns out that the book in question does have
some underlining and marginal commentary, and is thus, we may assume, to
some degree either subjectively or objectively defective. We must now ask
whether this defectiveness is trivial or insubstantial. A court might imagine
that such a question has an objectively-natured answer. 39 But one could easily
argue that this inquiry is actually largely subjective.
Consider, for example, a law student who buys a used casebook. This
student prefers a relatively unmarked copy, but also, subjectively, values the
yellow highlighting of case holdings by the previous owner. Why isn’t the
question of the possible “triviality” or “insubstantiality” of this defect largely
subjective? Suppose another buyer of a used book intends to present the used
book to a third party in nearly pristine, unmarked condition, as a gift, with
some emphasis thus on appearance and aesthetics. If the defect in the good in
such cases is judicially considered to be substantial, it is hardly so on grounds
we would normally deem to be objective.
The law thus winds up tying itself into verbal knots in seeking to
meaningfully distinguish between objective and subjective tests in the
commercial law area. The presumably subjective quality of sheer honesty in
belief and action and good faith actually involves an element of objective
33

Id.
See, e.g., DAVID BRAYBROOKE, MEETING NEEDS (1987); Christian Bay, Needs,
Wants, and Political Legitimacy, 1 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 241 (1968); Evan Simpson, The
Priority of Needs Over Wants, 8 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 95 (1982).
35
See Kesner, 378 S.E.2d at 654.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
See id.
34
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reasonableness, 40 as one could act grossly and irresponsibly irrationally, but
honestly and, in some sense, in good faith.
Part of the explanation for the law’s incoherence in this respect may lie in
a judicial belief that “[a] subjective good-faith inquiry injects uncertainty into
the law of contracts and undermines one of the U.C.C.’s primary goals—to
promote certainty and predictability in commercial transactions.” 41 The
problem here is that what courts think of as objective tests, based perhaps on
what presumably reasonable persons would do under some, if not all, of the
presumably relevant circumstances, are no more determinate or predictable in
their outcomes than what courts think of as more subjective tests. A
supposedly objective reasonable person standard unavoidably involves not
only certain subjectivities, but basic indeterminacies, as we further explore
throughout the contexts considered below.
II. OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE TESTS IN TORT AND CRIMINAL CASES
The incoherence of the distinction between objective and subjective test
reappears in tort and criminal law contexts. It is common ground that in the
crucial area of tort negligence, the courts have never settled upon either a
supposedly objective or subjective test. As one scholar explains, “[the
question of] whether negligence should be defined objectively or subjectively
arises repeatedly and has often been debated, [but] the issue has never been
resolved.” 42 This perpetually unresolved debate has been in evidence at least
since the classic English hay rick fire case of Vaughan v. Menlove. 43 Attempts
to reach some sort of coherent middle ground on the issue are almost as
longstanding. 44

40

See, e.g., Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen’s Bank & Tr. Co., 713 S.W.2d 517, 533 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1986).
41
Casserlie v. Shell Oil Co., 902 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ohio 2009) (internal citations
omitted).
42
Warren F. Schwartz, Objective and Subjective Standards of Negligence:
Defining the Reasonable Person to Induce Optimal Care and Optimal Populations of
Injurers and Victims, 78 GEO. L.J. 241, 241 (1989).
43
132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1827) (pitting standards of ordinary prudence and care
against good faith action in accordance with the actor’s genuinely best, if somewhat
limited, judgment).
44
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Franklin Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 179 (1884)
(Holmes, J.) (“[Generally,] a man’s liability for his acts is determined by their
tendency under the circumstances known to him, and not by their tendency under all
the circumstances actually affecting the result, whether known or unknown.”). This
mixed formulation omits the further alternative of supposedly objectively considering
those circumstances that would have been known to a supposedly reasonable person,
under some specified circumstances.
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At a moral or legal policy level, the subjective versus objective test conflict
has often focused upon the opposing pulls of fairness to individual negligence
tort defendants and the safety of negligence tort plaintiffs and the broader
public. To accommodate the very real—one might casually say, objective—
cognitive or physical limitations of particular negligence defendants would
increase the risk of uncompensated injuries to innocent negligence plaintiffs.45
Concern for reducing the latter risk, however, may violate the popular
principle that “ought implies can,” 46 in the sense that moral and legal
requirements should not be imposed upon those persons who faultlessly cannot
comply with the standard at issue. 47
Of course, cognitive and psychological limitations of negligence
defendants are subjective in the sense that they pertain more directly to a
specific individual. They are less than fully subjective, though, in that what
we normally take to be personal limitations actually reflect alterable social
policies, social perceptions, priorities, and constructs. 48 The limits on the
mobility of a person using wheelchair technology are largely socially and
legally constructed. 49 But those same limitations on the part of negligence
defendants are objective in the sense that they can be introduced to the legal
processes through direct evidence. 50
What we think of as “a purely objective standard” 51 in the negligence
context may well actually aspire to no higher form of objectivity than that of a
perhaps short-term political or cultural group dominance, or a community
sentiment “crystallized by law.” 52 The scope, and the degree of inclusiveness,
of the most relevant dominant community in a given negligence case will of
course vary. 53 To the extent that the law requires reasonableness in negligence

45

See Schwartz, supra note 42, at 241.
See, e.g., Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, ‘Ought’ Conversationally Implies ‘Can’,
93 PHIL. REV. 250 (1984); Robert Stern, Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’ and Did Kant
Think That It Did?, 16 UTILITAS 42 (2004); David Widerker, Frankfurt On ‘Ought
Implies ‘Can’ and Alternative Possibilities, 51 ANALYSIS 222 (1991); Gideon Yaffe,
‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, 59 ANALYSIS 218
(1999).
47
See Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 46.
48
Warren A. Seavey, Negligence—Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARV. L. REV. 1,
4 (1927).
49
SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECTED BODY: FEMINIST PHILOSOPHICAL
REFLECTIONS ON DISABILITY 57 (1996).
50
Id.
51
Seavey, supra note 48, at 10.
52
Id.
53
Id.
46
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cases, the law will thus again reflect the various supposedly subjective and
objective elements of any such reasonableness standard. 54
These inseparabilities of supposedly objective and subjective tests recur in
other tort and criminal law-related contexts. 55 The idea of probable cause, for
example, involves various entangled threads of supposedly more and less
objective and subjective considerations. 56 The Supreme Court declared in
Davenpeck v. Alford that “[w]hether probable cause exists depends upon the
reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer
at the time of the arrest.” 57 This principle already excludes considerations that
any reasonable person would know, if those considerations were not actually
known, perhaps for individualized or idiosyncratic reasons, to the arresting
officer. 58
Yet the Court also broadly declared that “an arresting officer’s state of
mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of
probable cause.” 59 The Court here assumed, dubiously, that what was actually
known to, and sufficiently appreciated by, an arresting officer is always
“objective.” 60 But the law can hardly filter apparently subjective elements out
of any such determination. 61 The determination of whether probable cause
exists therefore unavoidably partakes of purportedly objective and subjective
elements.
The related area of the entrapment defense to criminal accusations seems
at first to involve a primarily subjective test.62 The Supreme Court in Hampton
v. United States explicated that “the entrapment defense focuses on the intent
or predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime.” 63 In so saying, the
54
See id. at 4 (“[I]n attempting to classify [the negligence defendant’s] conduct
as right or wrong, we necessarily carry into our judgment an indefinite amount of our
mental equipment, including our own standards and our own will.”).
55
See Davenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152–53 (2004); Vaughan v. Menlove,
132 Eng. Rep. 490, 492 (1827).
56
See Davenpeck, 543 U.S. at 152, 153.
57
Id. at 152 (citing Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003)). For a similar
mix of objective and subjective considerations, see A.M. ex rel. F.M. v. Holmes, 830
F.3d 1123, 1138 (10th Cir. 2016).
58
Davenpeck, 543 U.S. at 152 (citing Maryland, 540 U.S. at 371).
59
Id. at 153 (citing Wren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 912–13 (1996))
(apparently focusing on motives or thought processes of arresting officers).
60
Id. at 154.
61
See, e.g., Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 398–99 (7th Cir. 2007)
(“Probable cause is not evaluated . . . based upon ‘the facts as an omniscient observer
would perceive them,’ but . . . by the facts ‘as they would have appeared to a reasonable
person in the position of the arresting officer.’” (quoting Kelley v. Myler, 149 F.3d
641, 646 (7th Cir. 1998))).
62
Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488 (1976).
63
Id.
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Court’s focus may be not so much on the objective versus subjective test
distinction, but on distinguishing the defendant’s predisposition from the
conduct, or misconduct, of government agents. 64 The Court’s apparent focus
on the workings of the defendant’s mind often may be intended in some
relatively objective sense.65 But the Court reverts to literally subjectivist
language in then concluding that entrapment arises “only when the
government’s deception actually implants the criminal design in the mind of
the defendant.” 66 To call the entrapment defense either objective or subjective
is thus at best useful in certain limited respects, while being fundamentally
misleading in crucial respects.
Thus here and elsewhere 67 the courts continually fail to construct, or
coherently distinguish between, objective and subjective tests. Yet they
endorse and relentlessly pursue such distinctions. 68
As it turns out, though, the incoherence of such attempted distinctions
comes into play even more prominently in a variety of civil rights-related
cases, as we briefly explore immediately below.69
III. OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE TESTS IN CIVIL RIGHTS AND QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY CASES
It is well established in the federal law of employment discrimination that
a plaintiff alleging hostile environment sexual harassment must satisfy both an

64

See id. at 488–89.
As, roughly, in the oversimplified idea that supposedly “objective facts could
be used to determine subjective [i.e., actual or objective] knowledge.” In re Forfeiture
of One 1970 Chevrolet Chevelle, 215 P.3d 166, 171 (Wash. 2009) (en banc) (holding
that vehicles held not forfeitable due to owners’ lack of actual knowledge of criminal
activities).
66
Hampton, 425 U.S. at 489; see also United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436
(1973).
67
Consider in particular the number of distinct senses of objectivity and
subjectivity applicable to cases forbidding the execution of persons with (particular
sorts or degrees of) intellectual disability. For a start on this controversial area of law,
see Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014) (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 321 (2002)) (“[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments . . . forbid the execution
of persons with intellectual disability . . . .”); Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 486–
87 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 2407 (2016) (citing Ex Parte
Cathey, 451 S.W.3d 1, 10, 10 nn.22–23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)) (“[W]e have recently
discussed the subjectivity surrounding the medical diagnosis of intellectual disability
. . . .”).
68
Joseph A. Colquitt, Rethinking Entrapment, 4 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1389, 1390
(2004).
69
See infra Section III.
65

134

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 16, No. 1

objective and a subjective test.70 The Supreme Court has specified that “a
sexually objectionable environment must be both objectively and subjectively
offensive, one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one
that the victim in fact did perceive to be so.” 71
The latter, assumedly subjective, element is obviously problematic on the
broader merits. By its logic, no woman who because of youth, inexperience,
or any form of institutionalized socialization believed at the time that the
harassment in question was to be accepted as normal can possibly prevail,
regardless of how severe or pervasive the harassment was. More illuminating
for our purposes is the first, presumably objective, test element, which focuses
on offensiveness, or hostility, or abusiveness as judged by “a reasonable
person.” 72 This offensiveness must be of a sort not merely that a reasonable
person could feel, but that a reasonable person would feel. 73 Taken literally,
any degree of dispute among assumedly reasonable persons in this regard 74
would thus entirely undermine the plaintiff’s case.
It has often been suggested, however, that the proper way to formulate this
purportedly objective test is not in terms of the perspective of a reasonable
person, but in terms of, in appropriate cases, a reasonable woman, 75 or a
reasonable victim 76 of the harassment in question. Under this point of view,
the supposedly objective hostile environment test should focus on a
purportedly “reasonable” person who bears any and all of the particular
subjective qualities that the courts somehow take to be legally relevant under
the circumstances of the case. 77
70

See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787–88 (1998).
Id. at 787 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993)).
72
Id. The “reasonable person” language is derived from Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.
73
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787; Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.
74
See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (“We realize that
there is a broad range of viewpoints among women as a group, but we believe that
many women share common concerns which men do not necessarily share.”).
75
See, e.g., id.
76
See, e.g., id. at 878. For a relevant discussion, see Robert S. Adler & Ellen R.
Pierce, The Legal, Ethical, and Social Implications of the “Reasonable Woman”
Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 773, 773 n.2 (1993).
More broadly, see McGinest v. GTE Service Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1112 (9th Cir.
2004) (“In order to survive summary judgment, McGinest must show . . . a genuinely
factual dispute as to . . . whether a reasonable African-American man would find his
workplace so objectively and subjectively racially hostile as to create an abusive
working environment . . . .”). In the context of the “unwelcomeness” element, see
Larsa K. Ramsini, The Unwelcomeness Requirement in Sexual Harassment: Choosing
a Perspective and Incorporating the Effect of Supervisor-Subordinate Relations, 55
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1961, 1962–63 (2014) (noting the range and variety of
perspectives available for potential judicial adoption).
77
Adler & Pierce, supra note 76, at 776.
71

2017

OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE TESTS IN THE LAW

135

Among the subjectivities associated with an abstract reasonable person
standard is the risk that such a disembodied entity will lead courts to presume
against, to underplay, or even to omit relevant circumstances, backgrounds,
histories, relationships, expectations, and experiences in determining how such
a person would react. 78 It is possible to try to preserve some pretense of
objectivity by declaring that the reasonable person standard should always take
(objectively) proper account of all of the (objectively) relevant circumstances
of the particular case, including elements of gender, race, migrant status, and
any other relevant status. 79 But all other concerns aside, this alternative
preserves merely the most superficial, formalistic illusion of objectivity.
In substance, the test must recognize that reasonable judgments of
offensiveness often vary with the more individualized, group-based, relational,
psychological, or otherwise relevant subjective qualities of both victims and
harassers. A particular verbal expression plainly need not be universally
offensive to all reasonable hearers in order to come within the logic of the
sexual harassment statute. As in the case of classic “fighting words,” 80 the
same utterance at any given time and place could have more or less adverse
associations for some reasonable hearers, minimal offensiveness to other
reasonable hearers, and may have even overall positive associations, in some
contexts, to yet other reasonable hearers. 81
Similarly dubious is the claim to an objective test for qualified immunity
of personal defendants in Section 1983 actions. 82 The Supreme Court rejected
what it termed a subjective test in favor of a supposedly objective test for such
qualified immunity in Harlow v. Fitzgerald. 83 Harlow thus held that
“government officials performing discretionary functions generally are
78

See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879 (“We adopt the perspective of a reasonable woman
primarily because we believe that a sex-blind reasonable person standard tends to be
male-based and tends to systemically ignore the experiences of women.”). For
discussion, see Elizabeth L. Schoenfelt et al., Reasonable Person Versus Reasonable
Woman: Does It Matter?, 10 J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 633, 669 (2002).
79
See Christopher Jackson, Reasonable Persons, Reasonable Circumstances, 50
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 651, 654 (2013).
80
See infra Section IV for the discussion of Chaplinsky-style fighting words.
81
Note the subtle arguments with regard to what are most commonly, but not
invariably, thought of as offensive ethnic slurs in the trademark case of Lee v. Tam,
808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).
82
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817–19 (1982) (construing petitioners’
qualified immunity defenses in the context of various constitutional claim against
federal officials, and explaining that its formulation would also apply to actions
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against state officials).
83
Id.; see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987) (citing Harlow,
457 U.S. at 819 for the proposition that whether an official protected by qualified
immunity may be held personally liable for allegedly unlawful action turns on the
objective reasonableness of the action).
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shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” 84
An objective test in this context would seem to imply that all else equal,
the standard in, say, constitutionally unreasonable search cases should be the
same for a specialist government legal advisor, a chief of police, an
inexperienced police officer, a public utility meter reader, and a newly hired
substitute public school teacher. 85 For simplicity’s sake, we shall assume this
to be consistently the case. 86 It is possible to read the Court’s objective
standard as instead focusing on a reasonable person in light of some or all of
the various relevant particular circumstances and capabilities of the particular
civil rights defendant. 87 But this would ultimately deprive the test of any
pretense to distinctive objectivity.
The crucial element of subjectivity in the Court’s qualified immunity test
relates to the classic “level of generality” problem, 88 recognized by the Court
itself in the case of Anderson v. Creighton. 89 If the right in question is
expressed as, say, a general right to due process, then a finding of a violation
of that right will always preclude any defense of qualified immunity, since the
84

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818–19; White v. Pauley, 137 S. Ct. 548, 557 (2017);
Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015); City of San Franciso v. Sheehan, 135
S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015); Lisa R. Eskow & Kevin W. Cole, The Unqualified
Paradoxes of Qualified Immunity, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 869, 919 (1998) (“The
touchstone for qualified immunity is Harlow’s standard of ‘objective legal
reasonableness.’”).
85
For public school student strip search cases involving the pursuit of limited
amounts of cash, see Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 2003);
Jenkins ex rel. Hall v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821 (11th Cir. 1997).
Excessive force claims may explicitly draw upon somewhat more particularization, if
not also upon elements of subjectivity. See, e.g., Pauly v. White, 814 F.3d 1060, 1070
(10th Cir. 2016) (“We review . . . claims of excessive force under a standard of
objective reasonableness, judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene.”).
86
We also set aside any subjectivities involved in determining whether the law
can be clearly established in the absence of any cases from particular jurisdictions or
levels. For one possible approach, see Thomas, 323 F.3d at 955 (“[O]nly Supreme
Court cases, Eleventh Circuit case law, and Georgia Supreme Court case law can
‘clearly establish’ law in this circuit.”).
87
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 (“Nevertheless, if the official pleading the defense
claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither knew nor should
have known of the relevant legal standard, the defense should be sustained.”).
88
For background discussion, see Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels
of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990); see also the
classic debate between Justices Scalia and Brennan in the paternal visitation rights
case of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989).
89
483 U.S. 635, 639–40 (1987).
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right to due process is so well established. 90 Any government official should
recognize at all times that due process violations are, of course, impermissible.
But if the right in question is, at the other extreme, expressed at an unduly
specific, particularized level—perhaps including named persons, days of the
week, and what was consumed for breakfast—there will never be pre-existing
case law sufficient to clearly establish the right in question.
The classic level of generalities problem is thus typically characterized by
(arguably arbitrary) choices among degrees of abstraction or concreteness in
how a claim of right is to be analyzed, or more literally, in terms of degrees of
generality or specificity of the rights claim at issue.91 Thus while it is doubtless
good for the law to establish that unreasonable searches and seizures are
prohibited, 92 this general rule does not tell us whether a strip search for
missing money is unreasonable under particular circumstances. 93 In deciding
actual cases, we would need the guidance of at least somewhat more concrete,
specific, contextualized formulations. Anderson recognized this need for some
degree of specific contextualized formulations of the right in question. 94
Inevitably, the most relevant concrete, specific, contextualized
formulations of a right will import one degree or another of particularized
subjectivity. 95 Thus some physical searches of a public school student may be
constitutionally permissible, at least in extreme cases, as when student safety
is clearly and immediately implicated and the search seems superficial and
inoffensive. 96 But we would typically want to consider some elements of the
apparent subjectivities of the student, or students, to be searched. Could it
matter whether the search is conducted by someone more or less well known
to, or trusted by, the student being searched? Could the lack of any previous
experience of being publicly searched matter? Could the degree of what one
might call the maturity, sensitivity, vulnerability or the resilience of the
persons being searched similarly matter? Could the students’ personal sense
of privacy, or the subjective value thereof, ever matter? Or the degree of
possible embarrassment, if not humiliation? 97
These presumably subjective considerations often factor into whether the
general right against unreasonable searches has been violated and, as well, to
whether the public official conducting the search—perhaps the student’s
90

Id. at 639.
See id.
92
See, e.g., supra note 89 and accompanying text; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 333 (1985).
93
See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
94
See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639–40 (“[I]n the light of pre-existing law the
unlawfulness [of the official conduct] must be apparent.”).
95
See id.
96
See New Jersey, 469 U.S. at 341–43.
97
See id. at 338–39.
91
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teacher—ought to have recognized the right violation at issue. 98 Thus again,
even a legal rule that purports to reject subjectivity must, on its own logic,
embrace and account for what the law takes to be subjective considerations. 99
And as it turns out, an equal and opposite form of this general incoherence is
on display in some First Amendment cases, as we now briefly illustrate. 100
IV. OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE TESTS IN FIRST AMENDMENT-RELATED
CASES
As we have seen, the standard legal test for qualified immunity
incoherently insists on what it considers objective, at the expense of what it
takes to be subjective.101 As it turns out, the courts commit what amounts to
an equal and opposite mistake in the constitutional defamation doctrine of
actual malice, where a supposedly subjective test inescapably incorporates
evidently more objective considerations. 102
Where the actual malice doctrine is applicable, it requires that the
defamation plaintiff show that the statements at issue were made with either
subjective reckless disregard of their falsity, 103 “a high degree of awareness of
. . . probable falsity,” 104 or actual “serious doubts” 105 as to the truth of the
assertions at issue. The actual malice test is thus thought to be subjective. 106
In practice, though, courts in actual malice cases do not routinely attempt
to establish the existence and contents of “other minds.” 107 A libel defendant’s
claim of good faith is instead typically tested on the basis of what the courts
would take to be more objective considerations.108 Such considerations could
include, say, written evidence that the libel defendant simply concocted the
98

Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 375 (2009) (noting
the need to consider the student’s “adolescent vulnerability” under the Fourth
Amendment standard).
99
Id. at 374–75 (2009).
100
See infra Section IV.
101
See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text.
102
See infra notes 108–12 and accompanying text.
103
See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
104
See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991)
(quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964)); see also Harte-Hanks
Commc’n, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667 (1989).
105
St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 733.
106
Harte-Hanks Commc’n, Inc., 491 U.S. at 688; Young v. Gannett Satellite Info.
Network, Inc., 734 F.3d 544, 547 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting id.).
107
For a sense of some of the philosophical complications, see Alec Hyslop, Other
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
PHILOSOPHY
Minds,
STANFORD
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/other-minds [https://perma.cc/Q959-P9N8] (last
visited Oct. 20, 2017).
108
See Masson, 501 U.S. at 510.
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claim in the absence of any grounds or evidence, 109 or on the basis of readily
checkable but unchecked (false) claims, 110 or the “inherently improbable” 111
nature of the claim, or other “obvious reasons to doubt” 112 the claim in
question. Crucially, what a court takes to be inherently improbable or
obviously dubious need not have actually appeared doubtful to the actual libel
defendant in the course of that defendant’s presumably subjective thought
processes. 113
In sharp contrast, the classic Chaplinsky test for what amounts to
unprotected “fighting words” 114 is officially thought to be objective, as
opposed to subjective. 115 The seminal case of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
explained that “the word ‘offensive’ is not to be defined in terms of what a
particular addressee thinks,” 116 but rather by “what men 117 of common
intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an average 118
addressee to fight.” 119
The basic problem here is that fighting words are typically not addressed
to average persons, or to persons who are otherwise unspecified and somehow
deemed ordinary. Victims of fighting words, and of hate speech more
generally, are instead typically targeted specifically as members of one or more
specific racial, ethnic, religious, or sexual minorities. 120 The reaction to a
group-specific epithet by targeted persons who do not identify at all with the
verbally targeted group might take many forms, including various levels and
degrees of disagreement and, certainly, understandable befuddlement. But an
otherwise meaningful fighting words doctrine that explicitly ignores
subjective elements plainly fails of its evident purpose.
109

See St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732.
See id. at 730.
111
Id.; see also Tucker v. Fischbein, 237 F.3d 275, 284–85 (3d Cir. 2001).
112
St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732; Murphy v. Bos. Herald, Inc., 865 N.E.2d 746, 753
(Mass. 2007).
113
Consider, classically, the psychological defense mechanisms catalogued in
ANNA FREUD, THE EGO AND THE MECHANISMS OF DEFENSE (1936), as well as the rich
variety of important subconscious cognitive biases discussed in DANIEL KAHNEMAN,
THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2013).
114
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572–74 (1942).
115
See id. at 573.
116
Id.
117
Our point here would not be crucially affected by reformulating the test in terms
of “persons” rather than “men,” however important such distinctions are in other
contexts. See supra Section III.
118
“Average,” as distinct, presumably, from the addressee in all of his or her
relevant subjectivity and particularity.
119
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
120
See, e.g., Crosby v. United States, No. 2:11-cr-00023-GZS, 2015 WL 1457430,
at *9 (D. Mass. Mar. 30, 2015).
110
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We can appreciate the Chaplinsky Court’s unwillingness to validate a
violent physical retaliation that seems baseless, utterly unforeseeable, or
hypersensitive. 121 But a supposedly objective test focusing on a disembodied,
abstract, nearly cultureless, and otherwise nondescript ordinary person implies
the lack of any understandable emotional motive to immediately physically
react (in many cases), and thus effectively abolishes the category of fighting
words, even as it claims to validate that category. If a fighting words doctrine
is to make sense, it must instead take account, to one degree or another, of
persons as they somehow relevantly are, including their own histories,
affiliations, identities, aspirations, and presumed subjectivities.
The attempt to distinguish between objective and subjective tests also
arises implicitly in the free speech context of online “true threats.” 122 For
example, in Elonis v. United States, 123 the Court addressed, without thoroughly
resolving, whether mens rea was necessary to convict the defendant of making
threatening online communications. 124 Vacating the conviction, the Court
observed that “[t]he jury was instructed that the Government need prove only
that a reasonable person would regard Elonis’ communications as threats, and
that was error. Federal criminal liability does not turn solely on the results125
of an act without considering the defendant’s mental state.” 126
The Court in Elonis thus evidently contrasted a reasonable third-person
perspective with the communicator’s own mental state. Consider, though, the
reactions of any actual person being allegedly threatened. A focus on the
person allegedly being threatened raises problems akin to those referred to
above in the Chaplinsky “fighting words context.” 127 Specifically, which
vulnerabilities or other qualities or characteristics of the person allegedly being
threatened should be considered legally relevant and how they should be taken
into account?
Such inquiries bear upon the fundamental question of whether the speech
at issue should be considered legally threatening or not. Here again it is
undoubtedly tempting for courts to seek some distinction between objective
121

Problems of assumed “hypersensitivity” of observers are also raised in the
distinct first amendment context of Establishment Clause violations. See, e.g., Capitol
Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777–82 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (focusing on a hypothetical
reasonable observer who is appropriately informed and reflects community or
collective sentiments).
122
See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2007 (2015).
123
Id.
124
See id. at 2013 (declining to decide whether a mens rea of reckless
indifference—as distinct from specific intent to threaten—might suffice for liability).
125
Or presumably, the merely likely results thereof.
126
Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2011, 2012 (citing Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S.
246, 252 (1952)).
127
See supra notes 94–101 and accompanying text.
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and subjective tests, or some combination thereof. On the one hand, courts
would want to avoid criminal or civil litigation over what we take to be plainly
innocuous language that is only eccentrically, or irrationally, construed by a
listener or reader to be threatening. So, there must be limits to subjectivity in
this sense.
But on the other hand, as in the fighting words context, 128 courts cannot
plausibly impose a more or less abstract and disembodied person standard.
What we think of as objectively threatening must inevitably involve some
variable mixture of subjective elements. A credible and immediate threat to
remove a wheelchair ramp, for example, might be genuinely threatening,
depending in part on whether the person addressed uses a wheelchair, her
realistic alternatives, and her own values and priorities regarding the use of the
wheelchair ramp in question.
There is a sense in which even the particular circumstances in which some
named addressee uses a wheelchair can be thought of as an objective matter.
So can any particularized personal history between the relevant parties. But
the idea of genuine threateningness must at some point consider more
evidently subjective considerations, including degrees of the addressee’s fear,
stress level, apprehension, anxiety, psychological vulnerabilities, and
resilience, along with the addressee’s values, priorities, and other qualities. At
some point, it becomes arbitrary, if not insensitive and unjust, to impose any
detailed standardized template on the emotional responses of allegedly
threatened parties. Thus again, in the true threat cases, supposedly subjective
and objective considerations unavoidably refer to and mutually incorporate
and define one another. 129
V. A FINAL ILLUSTRATIVE CONTEXT: OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE TESTS
IN THE DEPORTABILITY LEGAL ADVICE CASES

128

See supra notes 94–101 and accompanying text.
For further discussion of Elonis and true threat issues generally, see Michael
Pierce, Prosecuting Online Threats After Elonis, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 995 (2016); John
Villasenor, Technology and the Role of Intent in Constitutionally Protected
Expression, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 631, 652–53 (2016) (“A subjective standard
requires a jury to get inside the mind of a defendant and evaluate intent. By contrast,
under an objective standard the speaker’s intent is irrelevant. Instead, what matters is
whether a reasonable person would understand the statement to convey an intent to
inflict bodily harm.”); Jing Xun Quek, Elonis v. United States: The Next Twelve Years,
31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1109, 1109–10 (2016); Paul Crane, Note, “True Threats”
and the Issue of Intent, 92 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1235–36 (2006) (presenting a detailed
mainstream attempt to distinguish in general between objective and subjective tests);
Leading Case, Federal Threats Statute—Mens Rea and the First Amendment—Elonis
v. United States, 129 HARV. L. REV. 331 (2015).
129

142

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 16, No. 1

A final 130 perspective on the basic problem herein is available through the
numerous cases addressing issues of the effective assistance of counsel in the
deportation context.
These cases illustrate the “peeling an onion”
complications involved in attempting, vainly, to arrive at either a genuinely
objective or a genuinely subjective legal test, or a combination thereof.
These cases typically require a showing of deficient performance by one’s
attorney, 131 along with a showing of prejudice. 132 Prejudice to the client’s case
must amount to at least “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors,
[the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial.” 133 The defendant must also show “that a decision to reject the
plea bargain [and go to trial, thereby risking a longer sentence] would have
been rational under the circumstances.” 134
The courts explicitly emphasize that this showing of legally sufficient
causation and prejudice cannot involve a defendant’s mere declaration that had
he been properly informed of the possible or likely deportation consequences
of a conviction, he would have proceeded to trial. 135 Such a “mere declaration”
test is implicitly characterized by the courts as subjective, at least in the sense
that the alternative test—one that considers the reasonableness of going to trial
under the circumstances—is explicitly characterized as an objective test. 136
The rejected subjective test of prejudice involves not only a rejection of
the defendant’s mere unsupported assertions as to what she would otherwise
130

The range of illustrative contexts is indefinite. The current Federal Rule of Civil
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to be “objective” in character. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801
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CASE W. RES. L. REV. 279, 279–83 (1987). In general, though, there seems no obvious
reason why supposedly objective tests, as of mere reasonableness, must be more
stringent than supposedly subjective tests, which could presumably require either
massive or trivial amounts of evidence. Additionally, the Supreme Court’s claim that
professional school student competency judgments are more “subjective” than typical
student disciplinary investigations may itself be arbitrary. See Bd. of Curators v.
Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978).
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Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
134
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366–67 (2010).
135
United States v. Batamula, 823 F.3d 237, 240 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Pilla v.
United States, 668 F.3d 368, 373 (6th Cir. 2012)).
136
See id.

2017

OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE TESTS IN THE LAW

143

have chosen, but also a rejection of any possible relevance of any potential
unlawfulness, “arbitrariness, whimsy, caprice, ‘nullification,’ and the like” on
the part of a judge or jury, 137 and even of the “idiosyncrasies” 138 of any legal
decisionmaker. A defendant’s perhaps reasonable attempt to somehow factor
in, say, the possibility of jury nullification or even jury sympathy is entirely
ruled out in assessing the possibility of outcome-prejudice. This of course
ignores certain objectively relevant and perhaps even predictable possibilities.
Part of the problem here is that in some cases, the idiosyncrasies of a legal
decisionmaker, including the politics or proclivities of a judge, can be to one
degree or another predictable, and thus a part of the defendant’s objective
decisional environment. And there can clearly be a difference between what
a particular defendant, as she really is, clearly would have chosen, and what a
hypothetical disembodied reasonable person in general might have chosen. 139
Inevitably, there will arise some tension between a legal test for causation
or prejudice that rejects any consideration of an actor’s actual idiosyncrasy, in
the name of objectivity, 140 and, as the courts often hold, determines the
prejudice issue under “the totality of the circumstances.” 141 Inescapably,
various considerations thought to involve particularities, quirks, dispositions,
distinct priorities, values, idiosyncrasies, and even (known or suspected)
eccentricities help to comprise the individual defendant’s actual
circumstances, and thus the totality of the relevant and reasonably considered
circumstances.
The totality of the circumstances in the deportability cases thus must
inevitably encompass subjective as well as objective considerations. While
statistical evidence may be relevant, 142 so, certainly, may be what we normally
think of as subjective or individualized 143 evidence. And so, crucially, may a
defendant’s own idiosyncratic, perhaps even inexplicably intense, desire to run
the risk of a somewhat longer prison sentence in order to even slightly increase
the chances of entirely avoiding deportation. 144 Thus, there is simply no
137
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objectively reasonable and uniform tradeoff between prison time and the
chances of not being deported. The courts’ purportedly objective test of
prejudice must inevitably take account, among other considerations, the
relative intensity (however such intensity may be shown) of a particular
defendant’s distinctive aversion to deportation. 145
CONCLUSION
The cumulative evidence from across several important areas of the law
thus suggests that attempts to distinguish between objective and subjective
legal tests must inevitably result in some form of incoherence. All such efforts
are in that sense futile. To one degree or another they distract from more
productive judicial activities, including devoting more and better judicial
attention to the appropriate elements and goals of all legal tests.
Courts should thus pay no further attention to attempting to devise or
combine objective and subjective tests. Rather, courts should focus on crafting
judicial tests that crucially deliver at least minimally acceptable degrees of
procedural and substantive fairness to all affected parties. Beyond that
fundamental constraint, courts should, within limits set by appropriate
personal and institutional humility, and while respecting a sound constitutional
division of labor, seek to genuinely promote the broader public well-being.
One such approach to the latter challenge begins with a properly critical
focus on the historically familiar reasonable person. 146 In some respects, a
reasonable person test can indeed affirmatively contribute to the important
constitutional and moral value of the idea of equality. 147 But in other respects,
the familiar reasonable person test can itself also promote and legitimize
inequality. 148
In the case of a victim subjected to workplace sexual harassment, 149 and
in fighting words and true threat cases, we can see how consciously replacing
a literal reasonable man standard with a reasonable person standard might tend
F.3d 44, 52 (2d Cir. 2014) (noting the possibility of a particular defendant’s placing
“particular emphasis” on the possibility of deportation when deciding whether or not
to plead guilty).
145
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to alter the adjudicator’s tacit frame of reference in deciding the case in a way
that promote equality.
The problem, though, is that a formally neutral reasonable person standard
may still implicitly incorporate and validate “presumptively male, white, ablebodied, literate” 150 baseline expectations and standards. 151 It will typically still
be possible for persons who do not embody these tacit baseline presumptions
to seek to displace such presumptions by arguing for their inadequacy in any
particular case. 152 But such attempts to modify the purportedly neutral or
presumed standard, so as to reasonably accommodate persons whose
circumstances do not match those that are legally presumed, will be met with
resistance. 153 The risks of modifying implicitly presumed standards will thus
be borne by those who do not fit implicit norms. 154 Additionally, any argument
for adjustment of a presumed baseline assumption in light of one’s own
relevant actual qualities may seem, ironically, “like a plea for special
treatment.” 155
These considerations suggest that reasonableness tests, whether they are
thought of, however inadequately, as either objective or subjective, should, all
else equal, aim at some appropriate promotion of equality values. After all,
equality, at least in some sense, is written into the Constitution, 156 and into the
broader legal system itself as a foundational value. 157
There are important limitations, however, to designing legal tests with an
eye toward promoting equality, as opposed to fruitlessly pursuing some
coherent parsing of supposedly objective or subjective considerations. At a
general policy-oriented level, the idea of equality has by now become
massively indeterminate and widely varied in its basic concerns and
requirements. 158 The idea of equality, in itself, clearly tells us little. Much of
the value of many forms of equality may be instrumental in, or a means of,
promoting other values.
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Some particular forms of equality, however, may promote what has been
called the value of community, solidarity, or fraternity. 159 The idea of
promoting community has, for many, an intuitive and quite understandable
appeal. We of course cannot undertake a broad defense of the legal and moral
value of community here. But at the very least, we can point out that continued
judicial obsession with pursuing objectivity or subjectivity offers no payoff.
Rather than futilely pursuing the crafting of supposedly objective or subjective
legal tests, or focusing unduly on the idea of equality itself, courts should
instead seek, again within the constraints of fairness, to appropriately promote
forms of basic community 160 that are themselves linked to some forms of
equality.
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